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Research summary: Past inquiry has found that implementing complex
competitive repertoires (i.e., diverse and dynamic arrays of actions) is challenging, but firms benefit from doing so. Our examination of the antecedents
and outcomes of complex competitive repertoires develops a more nuanced
perspective. Data from 1,168 firms in 204 industries reveal that complexity initially harms performance, but then becomes a positive factor, except
at high levels. We use agency and tournament theories, respectively, to examine how key governance mechanisms—ownership structure and executive compensation—help shape firms’ competitive repertoires. We find that
the principals of agency theory and the pay gap of tournament theory are
both important antecedents of competitive complexity, and an interaction
exists wherein firms build especially complex repertoires when both influences are strong.
Managerial summary: In boxing, the fight does not always go to the bigger or stronger person, or even to whomever throws the most punches—the
fight is sometimes won by the boxer who is unpredictable, such as throwing
an uppercut when the opponent expected a right hook. Similarly, when companies compete in the marketplace, advantage is afforded not only to those
with more resources or who engage in more competitive activity, but also
to those whose actions are unpredictable. In this study, we develop the notion of “competitive complexity,” which describes the diversity and changing
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nature of a company’s competitive moves. Implementing complex competitive repertoires can be painful in the short term but, if done correctly, can
help company performance in the long run.
Keywords: competitive dynamics; institutional investors; executive compensation; agency theory; tournament theory

Introduction
In their quest to improve performance, firms battle one another via
competitive moves (Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999; Miller and Chen,
1994). While individual high-stakes actions, such as AT&T’s recent $48
billion purchase of DirecTV, tend to grab headlines, many firms seek
to gain advantage by relying on a diverse and dynamic mix of competitive moves, such as price reductions, marketing campaigns, acquisitions, alliances, and new products and services. For instance, in 2010
alone, healthcare company Baxter International initiated five different types of competitive actions. Others try to succeed by picking one
or two of these moves and using them aggressively and persistently
(Ferrier, 2001). Baxter’s competitor Endo Health, for example, initiated more than twice as many competitive moves as Baxter in 2010,
but concentrated its competitive activity within just two types. As
competition continues over time, engaging rivals with a complex set
of actions allows a firm to respond better to changing environmental
conditions, take advantage of emerging opportunities, defy imitation
by rivals, and keep opponents off guard. Strategy researchers call this
competitive repertoire complexity,1 and studies have found it to be positively associated with firm performance (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and
Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ndofor, Sirmon, and He, 2011; Yu,
Subramaniam, and Cannella, 2009).
Our study challenges the received wisdom about the benefits of
competitive repertoire complexity. While scholars generally portray
complexity as beneficial, we offer a more nuanced perspective wherein
understanding the effects of complexity requires accounting for the
role of time. Indeed, firms may struggle to orchestrate and benefit
from a diverse set of competitive action types in short order (Miller
and Chen, 1994). Therefore, we develop and test a model wherein
1. For ease of exposition, we use the terms “complexity,” “competitive complexity,”
and “competitive repertoire complexity” interchangeably throughout this article.
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competitive repertoire complexity has differential effects on firm performance in the short-term compared to its effects over time, controlling for firms’ competitive aggressiveness (i.e., their level of competitive activity).
In order to build understanding of why some firms embrace the
inherent trade-offs of competitive complexity while others avoid
them, we also investigate factors that may influence whether firms
rely on complex repertoires of competitive actions. Studies of the antecedents to complexity have mainly focused on competitive/industry environments and managerial/organizational characteristics (cf.
Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ndofor et al., 2011; Yu et al.,
2009). However, in their recommendations for future competitive
dynamics research, Chen and Miller (2012: 173) note that “increasingly insightful results may be forthcoming were we to move more to
micro-conceptions that lie between ownership structure and performance— specifically, just who are the owners and what types of competitive initiatives are they most apt to sponsor?” We leverage this
guidance by examining how governance mechanisms, such as ownership structures and executive compensation, shape a firm’s competitive repertoire.
Our study offers two main potential contributions to the literature. First, we develop a textured, temporal perspective on the relationship between competitive complexity and firm performance that
sheds light on how complexity influences firm outcomes, revealing
both positive and negative consequences. Second, we make strides toward integrating governance research with work on competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996). Although governance is believed to affect firms’
competitive moves, surprisingly few studies develop or test theory
about how shareholders and compensation structures affect competitive activity (Chen and Miller, 2012). Doing so can uncover a set of
previously obscured relationships and expose hidden forces that influence the extent to which firms engage in diverse competitive actions.

Conceptual Development
The concept of competitive complexity has its roots in competitive dynamics research. This body of inquiry has long focused on describing,
explaining, and predicting both the competitive interactions among
firms as well as how these interactions shape firm performance (Chen

C o n n e l ly e t a l . i n S t r at e g i c M a n a g e m e n t J o u r n a l 3 8 ( 2 0 1 7 )

4

and MacMillan, 1992; Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2005). For example,
much of the early competitive dynamics research focused on action-response dyads wherein the characteristics of a given firm’s initial competitive action influence the likelihood and speed of a rival’s response
and in turn these action-response sequences influence firms’ fates in
the marketplace (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Smith et al., 1991).
Scholars later focused attention on competitive action repertoire, a
concept that centers on the portfolio of moves a firm makes in a given
time period (Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). This depiction of
competitive action is consistent with views of strategy as a stream
of decisions (Mintzberg, 1978), a coordinated series of actions (MacCrimmon, 1993), or a simultaneous, sequential thrust of competitive
maneuvers (D’Aveni, 1994). Researchers have examined which organizational, market, and perceptual antecedents shape a firm’s competitive repertoire (Ferrier, 2001; Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan, 2006;
Yu et al., 2009) as well as how attributes of a firm’s repertoire affect
performance (Deephouse, 1999; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ndofor et al.,
2011). By leveraging the repertoire concept, these studies provide a
holistic depiction of how characteristics of a firm’s body of competitive activity allow it to compete effectively or cause it to struggle in
the marketplace.
The origins of portraying competitive complexity as an important
dimension of repertoires can be traced to Miller’s (1993) discussion
of its antonym: competitive simplicity.2 Scholars have conceptualized
competitive complexity in subtly different ways, but these depictions
share the common trait that complexity involves a firm’s diversity of
competitive actions (i.e., a firm’s range of actions and they are dominated by specific types—Basdeo et al., 2006; Chi, Ravichandran, and
Andrevski, 2010; Ferrier, 2001; Gnyawali et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2009).
2. Miller (1993: 117) introduced the notion of competitive simplicity, defining it as
“an overwhelming preoccupation with a single goal, strategic activity, department,
or world view—one that increasingly precludes consideration of any others.” This
spawned studies that focused on simplicity, or the tendency for the firm to carry
out a narrow set of actions, as a key attribute of a firm’s competitive action repertoire (Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and Chen, 1996a). Over
time, most competitive dynamics scholars embraced the concept of competitive
repertoire complexity to represent the opposite pole of a simplicity/complexity
continuum (Basdeo et al., 2006; Chi et al., 2010; Ferrier and Lee, 2002;Yu et al.,
2009). For example, Ndofor et al. (2011: 644) note that “competitive complexity
is the inverse of competitive simplicity” and Ferrier (2001: 866) refers to the construct as “competitive complexity/simplicity.”
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Empirical investigations have yielded valuable insights about competitive complexity’s antecedents and outcomes. In terms of antecedents,
prior performance (Miller and Chen, 1996a), top management team
(TMT) heterogeneity and experience (Ferrier, 2001; Miller and Chen,
1996a), interorganizational networks (Chi et al., 2010; Gnyawali et
al., 2006), and multimarket contact (Yu et al., 2009) all influence the
complexity of firms’ competitive repertoires. In terms of outcomes,
studies have found a robust relationship between competitive repertoire complexity and firm performance across a variety of industries
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and
Chen, 1996a).
The prevailing conceptualization of complexity has served the literature well, but it also presents an opportunity for improvement because it is limited to considering competitive repertoires at a snapshot
in time (Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001). Such an approach ignores
the inter-temporal change and newness of a firm’s repertoire of actions. For example, suppose a firm engages in a broad range of actions
distributed evenly among different types, but it relies on that same set
of actions repeatedly. A traditional definition would label this as complex, but consideration of repertoire change over time reveals a repetitive pattern that rivals could easily diagnose and counteract. Thus, we
suggest that a more comprehensive conceptualization of competitive
complexity should account for inter-temporal change and newness.3
At various junctures, competitive dynamics researchers have
broadly discussed the principles underlying inter-temporal change and
newness in competitive activity. For example, Miller and Chen (1994)
proposed the concept of “competitive inertia,” which describes the extent to which a firm alters its competitive stance over time. Lamberg
et al. (2009) explore aspects of “strategic consistency,” by which they
mean the stability of competitive behavior over time. A related concept is the degree of “surprise” or “unpredictability” (Ferrier, 2001;
Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Rindova, Ferrier, and Wiltbank, 2010), which
refer to a competitor’s relative inability to determine what is coming
next. These ideas collectively point to the concept of inter-temporal
change and newness of a firm’s competitive activity as important characteristics of competitive repertoire complexity. Consistent with these
ideas, we view complexity as encompassing the diversity, change, and
newness of a firms’ competitive action repertoire.
3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this important observation.
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Hypotheses
Performance outcomes
In his seminal article on competitive simplicity, Miller (1993) introduced the notion that a firm’s decisions about the simplicity/complexity of its competitive activities could have differential short- and longterm consequences. He posited that simplicity (complexity) would at
first increase (decrease) performance, but over long periods of time
should lead to lower (higher) performance. More specifically, firms
that rely on a narrow repertoire of competitive actions may enjoy immediate success, but in doing so they could be tethering themselves
to a confined set of skills that will not allow them to grow and change
with a changing competitive landscape.
To explain this in more detail, first consider how low levels of
competitive complexity (i.e., high simplicity) can benefit a firm in the
short term. Firms must develop a distinctive competence, and doing
so often demands that they be committed to doing a few things extremely well (Selznick, 1949). Parsimony in the types of competitive
actions in which a firm repeatedly engages allows for simple, efficient
routines and orchestrated configurations that can create competitive
advantage (D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990). Managers can exploit what
they do best and minimize the chance of error that comes with change.
Relatedly, carrying out simple competitive action repertoires can be
reassuring to external stakeholders. Competitive complexity makes
buying decisions more difficult, which can alienate customers. In addition, the stock market discounts uncertainty about firm activity because investors are unable to evaluate fully the earnings potential of
their actions (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Thus, low levels of competitive complexity can save costs, avoid disturbing customers (and provoking rivals), appease shareholders, and allow managers to capitalize
on their strengths (Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993). Accordingly,
our initial prediction is:
Hypothesis 1a: The complexity of a firm’s competitive action
repertoire over a given year (year t) is negatively associated
with short-term performance (at the end of year t).
In considering longer performance horizons, organizational learning helps explain why a certain amount of competitive complexity is
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likely to be beneficial to a firm’s performance trend (i.e., the direction
performance is headed over the course of several years).When firms
successfully and repeatedly leverage a narrow set of actions, executives can wrongly gain confidence in simplistic recipes, providing them
with a rationale for ascribing merit to their favorite actions and decreasing comparative regard for other competitive moves (Levitt and
March, 1988; Miller, 1993). This “superstitious learning” inhibits firm
performance over time because managers become myopic with respect
to their choices of competitive action types (Zollo, 2009). In contrast,
complex competitive repertoires outfit managers with more tools in
their metaphorical tool belt. Because complexity engenders changing
repertoires, valuable learning occurs as managers tease out which actions brought about which outcomes under differing circumstances
(Miller, Droge, and Vickery, 1997). As new challenges arise, having a
range of skills, resources, and experiences from which to draw allows
the firm to address these challenges by carrying out the most appropriate combination of competitive actions (Easterby-Smith, Crossan,
and Nicolini, 2000).
Moreover, complex competitive repertoires also serve as a signal to external entities about the firm’s underlying quality and their
changing mix of resources, allowing them to build a reputation over
time (Basdeo et al., 2006).Miller and Chen (1996a) argue that competitive repertoire complexity operates as a positive signal to stakeholders about the management skills of top executives, and Ferrier et
al. (1999) suggest that it signals a broader range of underlying firm
capabilities. This signaling process takes time as stakeholders receive,
process, and interpret signals, act accordingly (e.g., shareholders buying stock, information intermediaries upgrading their analyses, potential partners establishing alliances), and provide feedback about the
signals (Bergh et al., 2015). Taken together, these arguments about
improved adaptation, learning, and signaling suggest that increased
levels of competitive complexity can result in improved firm performance over time (i.e., an upward performance trend).
One important caveat is that organizations can go too far, such that
as competitive complexity reaches high levels its disadvantages can
begin to outweigh its advantages.4 Theory on resource orchestration
4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this key recommendation about the nonlinear relationship.
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helps explain why. Building on Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland’s (2007) contention that how firms select, bundle, and leverage their resources
via their strategic actions is a key determinant of performance, Ndofor et al. (2011) found that superior performance arises when a firm’s
actions appropriately capitalize on its resources. Subsequently, the
same author team provided evidence that the TMT is an important
determinant of how well a firm is able to attain “the conversion of
resources to competitive actions (i.e., type of actions designed to leverage the firm’s resource base) and the conversion of those actions
to performance (i.e., executing those actions)” (Ndofor, Sirmon, and
He, 2015: 1657).
In considering competitive repertoires, we contend that if a firm’s
array of actions become excessively complex (i.e., too diverse, changing, and new), the firm’s ability to orchestrate the associated managerial resources could become overwhelmed such that its effectiveness
declines. This parallels arguments offered in Penrose’s (1959) seminal book. Penrose suggested that firms often cannot grow as much as
market opportunities allow because they do not have enough managers to effectively implement the growth. New managers can be hired,
but it takes time for these newcomers to be effective in their jobs. Like
an army that penetrates deeper into enemy territory than its personnel and supply lines can support, a firm that ignores its managerial
constraints and grows beyond them is likely to suffer decreased performance. Drawing on the logic offered by Penrose (1959); Sirmon et
al. (2007), and Ndofor et al. (2011, 2015), we contend that a firm will
experience a downward performance trend if it enacts a bigger variety of competitive moves than the managerial resources provided by
its executives can support.
Further, with respect to learning, an overly diverse and constantly
changing competitive action repertoire makes it difficult for managers
to connect actions or sets of actions with particular outcomes (Levitt
and March, 1988). Signaling, too, could be adversely affected by high
levels of competitive repertoire complexity. If a firm changes its repertoire too quickly, external stakeholders may question whether the
firm has a coherent pattern of actions, and thus, wonder if it lacks
a cohesive strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). In sum, too much competitive complexity can bring about unintended consequences that bring
about a downward performance trend. Therefore, we hypothesize the
following:
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Hypothesis 1b: The complexity of a firm’s competitive action
repertoire over a given year (year t) exhibits a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship with a firm’s performance trend
over time (the direction of performance over several years
beginning at the end of year t). That is, increasing levels of
competitive complexity are associated with increases in the
firm’s performance trend, up to a certain level of competitive complexity, after which further increases in competitive
complexity are associated with decreases in the firm’s performance trend.
Given our prior hypotheses, firms likely desire to implement competitive action repertoires near the optimum inflection point between
simplicity and complexity. However, managers make decisions within
the context of corporate constraints that can inhibit their range of
choices (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Scholars seeking to explain the
antecedents of managerial decisions about the competitive actions in
which they engage have looked external to the firm, at the competitive
environment, and internal to the firm, at organizational characteristics, but few have looked upward, at the firms’ governance structures.
In strategic management, the most commonly investigated corporate governance structures are boards of directors, ownership structures, and mechanisms of executive compensation (Aguilera et al.,
2015).5 The dominant means of explaining the first two is agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the dominant means of explaining the last one is tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). To
obtain a multifaceted picture of corporate governance influences, we
examine antecedents from both theoretical perspectives.
Agency theory antecedents
Agency theory acknowledges that executives’ actions at times deviate
from the interests of shareholders. In response, shareholders rely on
5. Agency theory does not provide a clear rationale for the direction of relationships
between various aspects of the board and managerial decisions about competitive complexity (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). Rather than developing hypotheses about board influence, we control for it and devote special attention to interpreting the controls and creating a road map for future research on the topic.
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governance mechanisms to create better alignment between their interests and executives’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We hypothesize about how two of the most commonly studied mechanisms
of corporate governance—ownership concentration and executive compensation—affect executives’ propensity to undertake complex competitive repertoires.
Although most small owners do not have the means to influence a
firm’s actions, powerful principals can motivate executives to engage
in specific types of competitive behavior (David, Hitt, and Gimeno,
2001). Research examining shareholder influence on managerial decision-making focuses largely on institutional investors with their concentrated shares. An institutional investor is an organization, such
as a mutual fund, pension fund, or endowment, that manages more
than $100 million in equity (David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007). Such
investors are required to file 13-F Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports listing all holdings greater than 10,000 shares or
$200,000 in market value. These prominent shareholders own over
70 percent of U.S. equities and maintain an outsized influence on firm
behavior (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Kochhar and David, 1996).
Research has seen two types of institutional investors come to
the fore. Dedicated investors maintain concentrated shareholdings
in a small number of firms for a long time and do not trade based on
short-term earnings (Bushee, 2001). Dedicated institutional investors are sometimes called “relational investors” because they engage
with their agents and are active in establishing competitive strategies
(Bhagat, Black, and Blair, 2004). Transient institutional investors are
the opposite. They hold shares in a diverse range of firms, frequently
trade in and out of stocks, and are keenly aware of earnings reports.
We develop theory about how these characteristics make dedicated
and transient investors particularly consequential to managerial decisions about competitive complexity.
A significant presence of dedicated investors may allow executives an extra measure of freedom to experiment with a diverse set
of competitive actions. One reason has to do with these investors not
trading based on current earnings reports (Bushee, 2001). As we argued above, complex competitive repertoires can adversely affect a
firm’s short-term performance. Managers may be unlikely to undertake a complex repertoire if they believe doing so will result in owner
exit. Dedicated investors do not sell their holdings when faced with
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short-term losses, so they provide a level of assurance to managers,
who may undertake new and diverse competitive moves without fear
of stock market repercussions. Stated differently, dedicated investors
help reduce managerial myopia because managers do not feel external pressure from shareholders for immediate returns at the potential expense of long-term gains (Edmans, 2009).
Another reason arises because, in contrast to transient investors
who hold a diversified portfolio of equities to mitigate risk, dedicated
investors hold a small number of firms over time. Dedicated investors,
therefore, may consider action repertoire complexity as a key mechanism to mitigate risk. Relatedly, because dedicated investors own
only a few firms, they can comprehend and be sympathetic of the rationales that underlie a diversity of competitive actions. Given their
concentrated holdings, dedicated investors can devote sufficient attention to understanding managerial intentions for competitive market gains, and thus, engage in strategic evaluation of competitive repertoires rather than relying solely on short-term financial measures.
Complex competitive repertoires can take time to understand, and the
institutional investor that holds its shares only briefly may not readily grasp the potential of such repertoires. By understanding and appreciating the strategic consequences of complex competitive repertoires, dedicated investors enable their agents to consider engaging
in diverse competitive moves that yield advantages over time. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: Level of dedicated institutional ownership is
positively associated with competitive complexity.
Transient institutional investors are short-term investors who hold
broad portfolios of shares in many firms. This is a fundamentally different set of principals that are not necessarily interested in understanding the long-term performance implications of firm actions (Koh,
2007). The short-term focus of their trading behavior does not motivate managers to execute complex competitive repertoires. In fact,
they could contribute to managerial myopia as these investors impose
external pressure to focus on near-term objectives (Bushee, 1998).
Indeed, to keep transient investors on board, executives may need to
compete with relatively simple competitive repertoires with a view
toward short-term gains. Compared to dedicated investors who are
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likely to devote more effort to understanding complex business models and competitive repertoires, transient investors may be keyed in
to rudimentary signals of a firm’s business model facilitated by a set
of familiar competitive actions, again forcing managers to be myopic
(Rindova et al., 2010). Transient investors are averse to the short-term
performance declines associated with competitive complexity because
these investors tend to trade out from firms that experience even temporary downturns (Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy, 2003), so they are
likely to discourage managers from making decisions that engender
complex repertoires. Thus, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 3: Level of transient institutional ownership is
negatively associated with competitive complexity.

Tournament theory antecedent
Top executives design and implement competitive actions, and they
may use those actions with a view toward gaining promotion and
power. Therefore, firms often use compensation as a governance
mechanism to incentivize the right kind of executive behavior. Tournament theory suggests that the pay gap between the CEO and TMT is
a particularly potent motivator of executive action (Lazear and Rosen,
1981). Like agency theory, tournament theory is an economic theory
that explains how firms can use governance (i.e., compensation structures) to elicit desired behavior from agents (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990). Tournament theorists propose that executives compete
against one another for high-level positions, with the main prediction being that employee effort increases mainly with differences in
pay between levels, rather than the absolute levels of pay (Devaro,
2006). The strongest incentives lay at the highest level of the organization, wherein exorbitantly high CEO pay inspires the TMT to take
actions that maximize their chances of attaining the CEO spot for
themselves (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001). As a result, tournament theory would suggest that a wide CEO-TMT pay gap should increase the volume of a firm’s competitive activity (Gnyawali, Offstein,
and Lau, 2008).
In addition, we argue that the CEO-TMT pay gap (hereinafter simply “pay gap”) is also likely to be consequential to a firm’s competitive
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complexity because wide pay gaps compel top managers to make
choices that increase their potential for promotion (Narayanan, 1985).
The skills-based model of leadership (Mumford et al., 2000b; Yammarino, 2000) helps explain why. The model consists of six elements: (1)
individual attributes (such as motivation and personality), (2) knowledge and skills, (3) career experiences, (4) environmental influences,
(5) problem solving, and (6) leader performance (Mumford et al.,
2000b: 23). According to Mumford et al. (2000a: 155), a series of relevant studies offers “compelling support” for this model.
Within the skills-based model of leadership, career experiences are
crucial because “the experience leaders acquire in the course of their
careers should influence whether requisite knowledge and skills are
available for problem solving” (Mumford et al., 2000b: 24). Career experiences also have an indirect effect on knowledge and skills in that
a leader’s career experiences shape his or her individual attributes,
which are themselves important antecedents to knowledge and skills.
In turn, a leader’s knowledge and skills determine his or her ability to
solve complex problems and perform as a leader.
Applying these notions to the tournament among top managers
for the CEO position, we note that as one rises in the organization,
solving complex problems becomes more and more important; this
importance reaches its zenith within the executive suite. To win the
promotion tournament, which becomes increasingly attractive as the
pay gap widens, a potential CEO needs to convince others that he or
she can proficiently solve complex problems and that he or she will
perform well as the leader of a company. We posit that top managers who engage in a broad and changing mix of competitive action
types (and hence, more complex repertoires) gain a more diverse set
of relevant career experiences than those who implement simple repertoires, thus putting themselves in a position to win the promotion
tournament. Top managers with complex competitive repertoires to
their credit exhibit wider versatility and thereby demonstrate they
are more promotion-worthy than their less versatile counterparts,
all else being equal. Top managers vying for an enviable CEO position (i.e., one that involves a big jump in pay) want to demonstrate
that they are broadly knowledgeable and skilled leaders who are proficient at overseeing a wide range of competitive moves. As a result,
wide pay gaps not only result in high levels of competitive activity, but
also highly complex competitive repertoires (controlling for volume).
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Thus, we predict that:
Hypothesis 4: The CEO-TMT pay gap is positively associated
with competitive complexity.

Tournament-agency interaction
Agency theory and tournament theory both offer principals the practical directive that their interests and those of their agents need to
be aligned (Dalton et al., 2007). Our agency-based hypotheses described the direct influence of different types of principals who pressure agents to obtain the kind of behavior they desire (Hoskisson et
al., 2002). Meanwhile, our tournament theory hypothesis described
how executive compensation might shape top managers’ behavior, but
this does not involve external pressure from principals. Scholars suggest that executive compensation tournaments can amplify or substitute for pressure from principals (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001;
Rosen, 1986), so consideration of their potential interaction offers an
opportunity to advance understanding of agents’ behavior.
Conceptually, there are several possible scenarios that could manifest themselves when executive compensation tournaments and pressure from institutional investors occur simultaneously. These two governance mechanisms could operate independently. This might occur
if managers are motivated in different ways by external pressure and
internal compensation structures so that the two forces are additive
(i.e., no interaction). Another possibility is that one governance mechanism substitutes for the other. Compensation tournaments might
dominate managerial motivations so much that they make shareholder
pressure unimportant, or perhaps shareholder pressure is such an
overarching concern that it renders compensation tournaments ineffective. In either case, there would be a negative interaction between
our agency and tournament theory antecedents.
In contrast to these perspectives, we suggest that the presence
and influence of dedicated institutional investors will positively interact with the effect of large CEO-TMT pay gaps on executives’ propensity to develop complex competitive repertoires. High pay gaps already motivate managers to do so (Gnyawali et al., 2008), thus making
the presence of dedicated investors welcome. If managers are already
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motivated to engage in complex competitive repertoires to advance
their own interests, having acceptance from this key set of principals reinforces and confirms the preferred behavior. Instead of having a principal-agent problem (Dalton et al., 2007), dedicated institutional investors serve as confederates for managerial agents who
desire to engage in more complex repertoires with a view toward promotion. The combination of high levels of dedicated ownership and
high pay gaps pulls managers toward complex repertoires more than
they would be in the presence of only one of these governance mechanisms. This suggests a positive interaction between CEO-TMT pay gap
and the firm’s level of dedicated ownership. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 5: CEO-TMT pay gap (at the end of year t – 1)
complements the influence of dedicated institutional ownership (at the end of year t – 1) on the complexity of a firm’s
competitive action repertoire over a given year (year t). Specifically, there is a positive interactive effect between CEOTMT pay gap and dedicated institutional ownership on competitive complexity.
We do not develop a hypothesis about the interaction between
CEO-TMT pay gap and level of transient institutional ownership. Unlike the case of dedicated owners, there is no theoretical reason to propose an amplified effect in one direction or the other, especially since
we hypothesize opposite effects for these predictors. We examine and
discuss this further in a supplementary post-hoc analysis.

Methodology
Sample
Our sample included all publicly traded firms listed in the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 composite index from 2001 to 2010, plus actively
traded firms that were once a part of the S&P 1,500 but have since
been removed. Ending in 2010 allowed us to calculate the performance
trend over several years following the final year of analysis. The S&P
1,500 index includes firms in the S&P 500 large-cap, S&P 400 midcap, and S&P 600 small cap. The Institutional Shareholder Services
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(ISS) database adds a few other large publically traded firms, which
we included as well. ISS is the owner and maintainer of the database
of directors formerly held by the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC). This database is housed by the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). After eliminating
firms without complete data, we had a sample of 1,168 firms in 204
industries (i.e., four-digit NAICS industries).
We drew data from five main archival sources. We collected firm
action data from the RavenPack News Analytics database, which aggregates press releases and news articles. The Thomson Reuter database and ExecuComp provided data on ownership structure and compensation, respectively. We collected board data from ISS and firm and
industry level characteristics from Compustat.
Measures
Competitive repertoire complexity
Following previous competitive dynamics literature, we defined competitive actions as externally directed, specific, and observable moves
initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position (Ferrier et al.,
1999; Smith et al., 1991). RavenPack scans for action-level data in the
Dow Jones Financial Wires, Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and MarketWatch, plus all the daily press releases and regulatory disclosures from
22 different newswires (Twedt, 2016). The database records an entry
any time one of these sources reports on a company.
RavenPack covers over 36,000 companies, including all of the companies in our sample. The database identifies the first mention of
any given competitive action in order to eliminate duplication (Drake,
Guest, and Twedt, 2014). RavenPack uses a patented algorithm to classify articles into categories (Lin, Massa, and Zhang, 2014). Rather than
manually extracting news items, the program uses textual analysis,
parts-of-speech tagging, adjacent word relationships, and language
tokens (i.e., markers, such as dates) to identify and classify news articles. Though researchers have been manually coding business news
events for decades (e.g., Chen, 2009; Chen, Smith, and Grimm, 1992),
the steadily increasing volume of news sources and analyses calls for
more automated approaches. To deal with the tens of thousands of
business news stories published each day, RavenPack uses taxonomic
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recognition algorithms to (1) identify entities mentioned in a story,
(2) extract the story theme, (3) determine the role the entity played
in the story, and (4) categorize the story as an event. For each story,
RavenPack identifies a topic (which is a theme of events), group (collection of related events), type (class of events that share similar characteristics), and properties (such as the named entity and role), which
allow for precise categorization of each story (cf. http://www.ravenpack.com/products/ravenpack-news-analytics/ ).
For our study, we examined eight major types of competitive actions that align with prior research on competitive dynamics (Derfus
et al., 2008; Ferrier, 2001; Upson et al., 2012). These are as follows:
new product actions, capacity-related actions, pricing actions, marketing actions, acquisitions, strategic alliances, market expansion, and
legal actions. Table 1 shows examples of each type. Our data collection uncovered 87,941 total competitive actions. This is an average of
10.76 actions per firm per year (firms may be in the data for less than
10 years, for example if they are acquired), which is consistent with
prior research (Derfus et al., 2008; Rindova et al., 2010).
Based on the RavenPack identification of competitive actions, we
created a composite measure of competitive repertoire complexity
annually for each firm in our sample. Competitive dynamics scholars nearly always measure competitive complexity using some form
of weighted diversity index, such as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI) (Basdeo et al., 2006; Ferrier, 2001; Yu et al., 2009) or Blau’s index (Andrevski, Brass, and Ferrier, 2013; Chi et al., 2010; Gnyawali et
al., 2006). Such an approach simultaneously reflects both how many
different types of actions there are in a repertoire and how (un)evenly
firms use different actions. Consistent with this approach, the first
component of our composite measure is a diversity index.
To measure this component, we use the Shannon index. This index
is a natural fit for the competitive dynamics literature. Claude Shannon (1948), who is widely known for having founded the field of information theory, developed an entropy index in the context of cryptography, wherein cryptographers faced a string of letters and were
trying to determine what could be future letters in the string. Shannon’s index is a mathematical representation of the string that shows
the more different letters there are in the string, and equal their proportions, the more difficult it is to predict future letters. Similarly, a
focal firm’s competitors face a set of actions that the firm selects from
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Table 1. Action categories and example headlines
Action category

RavenPack classification

Company

Example headline

New product actions a
Product Release
Barnes & Noble Inc.
Barnes & Nobel Studio Debuts New
			Series: Mr. Literary
Product Release
Novellus Systems Inc.
			
			

Novellus Systems Launches SOLA® xT
UVTP System for Sub-45nm High
Volume Manufacturing

Capacity related actions
Facility Close
FootLocker Inc.
Foot Locker Expects to Shutter 117
			Stores
Facility Upgrade
Cintas Corp.
			

Cintas Expands Document
Management Operations in China

Pricing actions
Product Price Cut
Atmel Corp.
			
			
			

Atmel Reduces System Cost in
Industrial Applications with
High-Quality Video Decoding
ARM926-based Microprocessor

Product Price Raise

Carnival Corp/PLC

Carnival to Raise Cruise Prices

Marketing actions
Campaign Ad
Office Depot Inc.
			
			
			
			

Office Depot and National Association
of Professional Organizers (NAPO)
Launch Campaign to Help Business
Professionals Get Organized in the
New Year

Campaign Ad
United Parcel Service Inc.
			
			

UPS Racing Unveils Commercials and
Online Sweepstakes to Launch 2010
NASCAR Season

Acquisitions
Acquisition - Acquirer
Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc.
			
			

Bio-Rad Complete the Purchase of
Certain Diagnostics Businesses of
Biotest AG

Acquisition - Acquirer
SPX Corp.
			

SPX Complete Acquisition of
Gerstenberg Schroder

Strategic alliances
Joint Venture
Scientific Games Corp.
			

Playtech Signs Joint Venture with
Scientific Games

Partnership
McAfee Inc.
Brocade and McAfee Enter Strategic
			
Partnership to Deliver
			
Comprehensive Network Security
			Solutions
Market expansion
Market Entry
Texas Instruments Inc.
Texas Instruments to Enter E-Reader
			Market
Market Entry
Synaptics Inc.
Synaptics Enters Home Appliance
			Market
Legal actions
Legal Issue - Plaintiff
Microsoft Corp.
			

Microsoft Sues TiVo, Claiming Patent
Infringement

Legal Issue - Plaintiff
DirecTV Group Inc.
			

DirecTV Sues Dish Network Over
’Why Pay More’ Commercials

a. “New product actions” describe product releases within a market in which the firm already competes. “Market expansion” describes
new product or geographic markets where the firm does not yet compete.
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a number of categories. These constitute a competitive repertoire,
much like a string of text. Competitors would be interested in knowing what likely future actions a firm will take, as a cryptanalyst wants
to know what are likely to be future letters in a string (strings are not
letters embedded in words because they are encoded).
The Shannon index “is comparable to the Hirschman-Herfindahl
index (HHI)” (Straathof, 2007: 298), but it offers a slightly more apropos measure of diversity for the context of competition between
firms because it encompasses the notion of quantifying the ability to
predict future letters/moves. By this we mean the difficulty a competitor would have predicting what future competitive actions might
be, based solely on examining prior actions (Jost, 2006). Statistically,
the two indices yield similar results, but the Herfindahl index fails
to capture variance among the most concentrated and the most diverse types of profiles. As an illustration of the indices’ differences,
consider their values for the case of five actions in five different categories and ten actions in ten categories. Using the Herfindahl index,
both of these repertoires return a score of one. However, the Shannon
index for five actions in five categories is 1.61 and for ten actions in
ten categories it is 2.30. Thus, the Shannon index recognizes the latter choice as being a more sophisticated repertoire of competitive actions, whereas the HHI does not.
The Shannon index is calculated as follows:
R

S = − ∑ pi ln pi
i=1

where pi is the proportion of competitive actions belonging to the ith
competitive action category of R total categories. This index ranges
from a high of ln(R) when all types of competitive actions are equally
common and approaches zero as actions become more concentrated.
The second component of our composite measure of competitive
complexity incorporates the notion of change, which we captured with
a measure of the difference between the firms’ competitive action repertoire in the prior year and the focal year of analysis. We operationalized this as the Euclidean Distance, D(t-1)t, between the two action
repertoires, as follows:
D(t−1)t = SQRT [( A1(t−1) − A1t )2 + ( A2(t−1) − A2t )2 … ( A8(t−1) − A8t )2]
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where A1 through A8 are the number of actions taken in action categories 1 through 8 by the focal firm in the indicated year. We chose
the Euclidean Distance measure because we are interested in how a
firm changes its competitive action repertoire from one year to the
next. Others, such as Ferrier (2001), and Ferrier and Lee (2002), have
used INDEL costs, which are calculated from the Levenshtein Distance
between competitive repertoires, to calculate what they call strategic
unpredictability. The two measures are similar, but the Levenshtein
Distance assigns penalties for every insertion, deletion, or substitution associated with conversion from one repertoire to the next because it is concerned with the order of events. Our data, however, are
annualized, so we do not wish to distinguish, for example, between a
pricing action followed (however long within the year) by an acquisition versus an acquisition followed by a pricing action. Thus, Euclidean Distance, rather than INDEL costs, is the appropriate measure for
annual competitive repertoire comparisons.
Euclidean Distance describes action repertoire change, or how
much the firm’s competitive repertoire has repeated itself from time
t – 1 to time t (Upson et al., 2012), but it does not capture the degree
to which firms are engaging in new action types. A firm could, for
instance, increase or decrease the number of competitive actions of
types in which they were already engaged. For example, in 2007 one
prominent retailer, the Gap, changed its competitive repertoire considerably from what it did in 2006, but it did so without introducing
any new types of competitive actions. To account for this, we counted
the number of types of actions in which a firm engaged at time t but
in which it did not engage at time t – 1. Although they both address
aspects of change from the prior year to the focal year, the Euclidean
Distance and the new action type count measure different things and
are not strongly correlated (r=0.12).
We created z-scores from the three assessments—the Shannon index, Euclidean Distance, and new action count—and summed these
scores to create a composite measure of competitive complexity. Our
use of this composite score helped ensure that our measure captured
the dimensions of competitive complexity noted in our conceptual development—diversity, change, and newness.
To illustrate why including change and newness improves our ability to capture competitive repertoire complexity, consider again two
prominent retailers in 2007. Using a diversity index alone, Kohl’s had
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a higher score than did Finish Line. Unlike that index, however, our
composite measure accounts for the fact that Kohl’s scored low on
change and added only one new action type in 2007, while Finish Line
had a high change score and added five new action types in 2007. As a
result, Finish Line scored higher on our competitive complexity measure than did Kohl’s.
Performance
We operationalized short-term performance as return on assets (ROA)
expressed as a percentage at the end of the focal year under investigation (Ndofor et al., 2011). We operationalized firms’ performance trend
over time as the slope of the regression of ROA over three years, beginning with the focal year of analysis (Connelly et al., 2016). Individual
firm growth trends allowed us to observe the trajectory of firm performance, providing more detail about firm-level changes than simple averages or snapshots of performance. We selected a three-year
period because it provides enough information (i.e., four data points,
t, t+1, t+2, and t+3) to calculate a relatively long-term trend without
getting too temporally removed from the competitive action repertoires under investigation.
Independent variables
The dedicated and transient ownership variables focus on the level
of institutional ownership, accounting for shareholders with at least
one percent equity in a focal firm during our sampling window. This
restriction removes owners with marginal equity positions. We categorized each institutional owner in accordance with Bushee’s (1998)
classification system as being either dedicated, transient, or neither,
for each year of the analysis. Dedicated and transient ownership are
thus the percentage of a firm’s total shares held by dedicated or transient institutional investors, respectively. On average, dedicated owners held 4.13 percent of firm shares and transient investors held 11.50
percent.
To arrive at these figures, we categorized each institutional investor according to their past trading behavior as described by portfolio diversification, portfolio turnover, and trading sensitivity. Portfolio diversification is a composite measure of the average percentage
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of the institution’s holdings invested in each firm, the average size of
the institution’s ownership position in its portfolio, the percentage of
holdings that are greater than five percent, and a concentration index of the institution’s holdings. Portfolio turnover is a combination
of the annual change in ownership in the previous two years and the
percentage of firms that the institution has held continuously over the
previous two years. Trading sensitivity combines a ratio of changes
in ownership position to firms’ earning announcements with the average earnings change in firms bought minus firms sold. Dedicated
institutional investors have low portfolio diversification, low portfolio turnover, and low trading sensitivity; in contrast, transient institutional investors have high portfolio diversification, high turnover,
and high trading sensitivity.
CEO-TMT pay gap measures tournament incentives among top
managers. We measured pay gap as the difference between the CEO’s
total compensation and the average total compensation of the TMT’s
four highest-paid members other than the CEO (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Shi, Connelly, and Sanders, in press). Because CEOTMT pay gap is not normally distributed, we monotonically transformed it by taking the natural logarithm of the difference, plus a
constant that made all observations positive (Shi, Connelly, and Sanders, 2016).We centered all independent variables before adding them
into our models.
Control variables
Prior research has suggested that large and high-performing firms can
have complex competitive repertoires (Ndofor et al., 2011), so we controlled for firm size as the natural logarithm of sales and prior performance as ROA at time t – 1. Firms whose resources are liquid may be
able to engage in complex repertoires, so we control for the current
ratio as (current assets)/(current liabilities). Old firms may be more
resistant to change, so we control for firm age. CEOs that also chair
the board of directors could be less creative in their competitive endeavors (Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996) so we control for CEO duality with a dummy variable. Because near-term options that executives
can exercise could motivate their self-interest in specific competitive
moves, we control for the TMT’s in-the-money, exercisable options. We
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are interested in competitive complexity as opposed to the volume of
competitive activity, so we control for volume of competitive activity
as the number of actions taken.
We also control for potential influence of the board of directors,
given our emphasis on corporate governance constraints. Board size is
a count of the number of directors. Board tenure is the average number of years a firm’s directors have served on the board (Hillman et
al., 2011). Board age is the average age of all a firm’s directors.
In addition, we control for industry characteristics that might influence competitive repertoires. Industry munificence refers to the resources available to all firms in an industry, which we measure as the
regression of sales over time divided by mean industry sales (Boyd,
1995). Industry dynamism refers to the level of instability in an environment; we calculated this as the standard error of munificence
(Boyd, 1995). Industry concentration captures whether a small number of firms dominate an industry; we measured this using a standard Herfindahl index of industry sales (Boyd, 1995). Because we have
panel data, we include year dummies to account for contemporaneous correlation (Certo and Semadeni, 2006).
Analytical technique
Our dataset is a hierarchical panel with firms nested within industries. We managed the annual panel settings using Stata’s xtset function. Because competitive norms vary by industry (Ferrier, 2001), we
needed to account for potential unobserved heterogeneity across multiple industries. We defined industry groups as all firms within a fourdigit NAICS classification because our large sample size afforded the
opportunity for a fine level of differentiation between groups. We
used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to analyze the data because
it allows for investigation of relationships across levels by recognizing the partial interdependency of observations and explicitly modeling both firm- and industry-level residuals. Panelized HLM controls
for potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity by accounting for
the panel structure of the data and both within- and between-industry variance (Hofmann, 1997).
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Results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for all study
variables. All variance inflation scores are well below a conservative
threshold of five, so multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern.
Hypothesis tests
We first examined the effects of competitive complexity on short-term
performance, as described in Hypotheses 1a. We measured both competitive complexity and ROA at the end of the focal year (time t) because competitive complexity constitutes a set of actions that occur
throughout the year, but ROA is measured on the last day of the year.
Conceptually, we intended to capture the actions’ immediate impact,
and the traditional lag structure could result in an appreciable gap between when the actions occurred and when we measure ROA. Consistent with this approach, we also measured the volume of competitive
activity at time t because this control variable also represents competitive actions taken throughout the year. We measure all other control variables with a one-year lag, at time t – 1.
Table 3 reports the results for the influence of competitive complexity on short-term performance. Model 1 reveals that the control variables of firm size, prior performance, in-the-money options, volume
of competitive activity, and board size and tenure are all predictors of
short-term performance. In Model 2, the coefficient for competitive
complexity is negative and strongly predictive of short-term performance (β =−0.280, p<0.001), providing support for Hypothesis 1a.
We also tested our hypothesis about the firms’ performance trends.
Here again, we used competitive complexity and volume of competitive actions at the focal year of analysis (time t) and all other variables
at the end of the prior year (time t – 1). Model 3 in Table 4 shows that
several controls (firm size, prior performance, current ratio, in-themoney options, board size, transient ownership, and pay gap) are key
predictors.6 Model 4 shows that competitive complexity is positively
6. Three of our controls showed different effects for short-term performance and
performance trend. Large firms, firms with good past performance, and firms with
smaller boards are more likely to perform better in the short term (Table 3). The first
two of these appear straightforward as large firms often enjoy economies of scale,
and past performance is an indicator of future performance. The link between small

2.37

2 Current ratio
0.57

0.04
0.11
4.27
0.95

13 Dedicated ownership

14 Transient ownership

15 Pay gap

16 Competitive complexity
−5.24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

13.49 −0.08 0.05 −0.02 0.00 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.03 −0.02 0.00 −0.03 0.00 −0.04 1.00

11.70 0.10 −0.01 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 −0.08 0.07 −0.05 −0.09 0.02 −0.01 1.00

2.26 0.42 −0.12 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.57 0.26 −0.10 −0.05 0.07 −0.08 −0.03 0.02 −0.18 0.16 1.00

0.12 0.25 −0.10 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.14 −0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.05 1.00

0.10 −0.29 0.11 −0.19 −0.05 −0.11 −0.18 −0.22 −0.08 −0.08 −0.09 0.11 0.01 0.06 1.00

0.07 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.01 −0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.19 0.01 0.03 −0.01 1.00

0.14 0.12 −0.10 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 −0.05 0.07 1.00

0.02 −0.06 −0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.06 −0.07 −0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.18 1.00

0.07 0.07 −0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.05 −0.05 −0.04 1.00

3.84 0.09 −0.01 0.15 0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.08 0.30 1.00

3.62 −0.03 0.07 0.08 −0.08 −0.02 −0.05 0.02 1.00

2.30 0.56 −0.30 0.39 0.04 0.11 0.19 1.00

25.24 0.38 −0.07 0.06 0.01 0.15 1.00

0.06 0.24 −0.05 −0.01 0.04 1.00

0.49 0.13 −0.05 0.15 1.00

15.81 0.42 −0.27 1.00

2.23 −0.44 1.00

1.51 1.00

S.D.

N=7,888, All correlations greater than |0.02| are significant at p<0.05.

a. Expressed as a percentage.

18 Performance trend

4.90

0.16

12 Industry concentration

17 Short-term performance

0.02

11 Industry dynamism

a

0.05

10 Industry munificence

60.81

6.61

9 Board age

9.27

8 Board tenure

10.76

7 Board size

6 Volume of competitive activity

5 TMT in-the-money, exercisable options 0.02

4 CEO duality

43.29

7.65

1 Firm size

3 Firm age

Mean

Variables

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations
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(β =0.183, p=0.032) associated with the performance trend. Model 5
then tests the hypothesized curvilinear relationship, suggesting that
the squared term of competitive complexity is negatively associated
with the firms’ performance trend (β =−0.017, p=0.064). The results
in Models 4 and 5 yield a pattern that is seemingly consistent with an
inverted-U shaped relationship, as predicted in Hypothesis 1b.
Table 5 reports the results for our agency theory predictions about
antecedents of competitive complexity. As shown in Model 6, firm
size, prior performance, in-the-money options, volume of competitive activity, industry concentration, and all our board variables are
strong predictors of performance trend. In Model 7, as predicted in
Hypothesis 2, firms’ level of dedicated institutional ownership is positively associated with competitive complexity (β =0.670, p=0.033).
The level of transient institutional ownership, however, is not associated with competitive complexity (β =0.132, p=0.625), so Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
We test our hypothesis about tournament theory in Model 7 together with the other direct effects. As predicted in Hypothesis 4, this
model shows that the direct effect of a firm’s pay gap between the
CEO and TMT is positively associated with competitive complexity (β
=0.384, p=0.016). The final hypothesis examines the interaction between our agency theory prediction about dedicated institutional ownership and our tournament theory predication about CEO-TMT pay
gap. In Model 8, this interaction is positive (β =10.559, p=0.002), as
predicted in Hypothesis 5.

boards and better short-term performance may be reflective of small boards being
able to make fast decisions, allowing them to be nimble and responsive to the environment. For the performance trend (Table 4), small firms often grow quickly, so although the level of their short-term performance (i.e., ROA) may not match that of
their large competitors, they are likely to see growth over time (i.e., large year-overyear percentage increases are common for small firms). The negative relationship
between past performance and performance trend could be due to firms that experience appreciable short-term declines, but then climb back to where they were before the decline. Last, large boards appear to improve performance over time. One
possibility is that large boards may make slow decisions, but they also make good
decisions. They may be less nimble than their small-board counterparts, but they are
also less likely to make big mistakes. We appreciate an anonymous reviewer encouraging us to note these differences and discuss possible reasons for their occurrence.
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Table 3. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables

Model 1 		

Model 2

Constant

−0.619

−1.038

0.782

(2.240) 		
Firm size

0.455

0.554

0.000

(0.122) 		
Prior performance

0.402
−0.088

Firm age

−0.001

0.400
−0.084

0.122

−9.844

0.312

0.227

0.011
−0.162

0.022

0.049

0.122
0.039

0.114

0.001

−0.691

0.034

2.888

−0.597

0.703

1.531

2.615

−0.451

1.397

0.165

2.374
0.708

2.402

0.132

0.829
−0.280

			

Included

N

8,173 		

8,173

Chi-sq

2365.2

2389.7

25 		

Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Short-term performance.

0.000

(0.065)

Included 		

df

0.379

(0.943)

Competitive complexity 			

0.000

0.127

(1.574)

0.453

(0.943) 		

Year dummy variables

0.884

(1.829)

(1.576) 		
Pay gap

0.205

(1.102)
−0.268

0.805

(1.831) 		
Transient ownership

0.700

(6.787)

(1.103) 		
Dedicated ownership

0.742

(1.810)

0.671

(6.796) 		
Industry concentration

0.319

(0.034)

(1.813) 		
Industry dynamism

0.001

(0.035)

0.257

(0.034) 		
Industry munificence

0.018

(0.063)

(0.035) 		
Board age

0.000

(0.006)
−0.149

0.011

(0.063) 		
Board tenure

0.000

(1.928)

(0.005) 		
Board size

0.195

(0.241)
−9.576

0.000

(1.929) 		
Volume of competitive activity

0.919

(0.009)

(0.241) 		
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options

0.139

(0.057)
−0.001

0.896

(0.009) 		
0.291

0.000

(0.009)

(0.057) 		

CEO duality

0.000

(0.124)

0.000

(0.009) 		
Current ratio

0.643

(2.239)

26

0.000
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Table 4. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables

Model 3

Constant

−2.119

Model 4
0.470

(2.935) 		
Firm size

−0.620

Prior performance

−0.097

0.000

0.011

0.000

0.042
−12.552

0.894

−0.005
0.179

0.473

−0.054

Board age

−0.002

0.238

−0.742

0.685

−2.242
3.303

0.119

4.244
2.375

0.001
0.879
−0.533
−2.162
3.197

0.039

4.235

0.288

(1.205) 		

2.298
0.183

0.037

0.906

−12.790

0.000

−0.007

0.406

0.167

0.042

−0.047

0.302

0.003

0.950

(0.045)

0.711

0.826

0.727

(2.370)

0.952

−0.469

0.958

(8.881)

0.133

−2.104

0.144

(1.440)

0.179

3.305

0.164

(2.376)

0.040

4.300

0.037

(2.060)

0.057

(1.206) 		

Competitive complexity 			

0.345

(0.046)

0.978

(2.060) 		

0.049

0.012

(0.082)

(2.376) 		

(2.060) 		
Pay gap

−0.048

0.000

(0.008)

0.038

(1.439) 		

0.165

(2.376) 		
Transient ownership

0.114

(8.882) 		

(1.440) 		
Dedicated ownership

0.171

0.360

(2.461)

(2.370) 		

0.933

(8.885) 		
Industry concentration

−0.012

0.000

(0.315)

0.000

(0.045) 		

(2.371) 		
Industry dynamism

0.933

(0.046) 		

0.965

(0.045) 		
0.960

−12.725

−0.096

(0.012)

(0.082) 		

(0.046) 		

Industry munificence

0.026

0.000

(0.074)

0.369

(0.008) 		

0.030

(0.082) 		
Board tenure

0.000

(2.462) 		

(0.007) 		
Board size

0.011

−0.735

(0.012)

(0.315) 		

0.000

(2.461) 		
Volume of competitive activity

0.364

0.585

(0.165)

0.000

(0.012) 		

(0.315) 		
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options

−0.097

(0.074) 		

0.363

(0.012) 		
CEO duality

0.000

(0.012) 		

(0.074) 		
Firm age

−0.686

−1.605
(2.939)

(0.162) 		

0.000

(0.012) 		
0.367

0.532

(2.937) 		

(0.160) 		

Current ratio

−1.834

Model 5

2.293

0.057

(1.205)

0.032

0.263

0.006

			(0.085) 		(0.096)
Competitive complexity2 					

−0.017

0.064

					
(0.009)
Year dummy variables
N
Chi-sq
df

Included 		

Included 		

Included

7,702 		

7,702 		

7,702

574.2

0.000

25 		

Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Performance trend.

579.1

0.000

26 		

582.8
27

0.000

C o n n e l ly e t a l . i n S t r at e g i c M a n a g e m e n t J o u r n a l 3 8 ( 2 0 1 7 )

29

Table 5. Results of hierarchical linear modeling
Variables

Model 6 		

Model 7 		

Model 8

Constant

−1.771

−1.769

−1.725

0.000

(0.381) 		
Firm size

0.372

0.000

(0.021) 		
Prior performance

−0.005
0.013
0.001

0.174

0.071
0.861

0.083

0.038
0.042

0.000

−0.027

Board age

−0.015

0.000

−0.405

0.508

−0.464

0.042
−0.026
−0.015
0.232
−0.316

0.000

(0.236) 		

−0.462
0.670

0.499

0.063

0.125

0.825

0.012

0.039

0.000

0.042

0.000

(0.011)

0.000

−0.025

0.000

(0.006)

0.014

−0.015

0.013

(0.006)

0.474

0.220

0.497

(0.325)

0.798

−0.323

0.794

(1.233)

0.050

(0.235) 		

Dedicated ownership 			

0.001

(0.001)

0.000

(1.234) 		

0.049

0.206

(0.328)

(0.325) 		

0.743

(1.235) 		
Industry concentration

0.039

0.012

(0.041)

0.009

(0.006) 		

(0.325) 		
Industry dynamism

0.112

(0.006) 		

0.011

(0.006) 		
0.215

0.859

0.003

(0.002)

(0.011) 		

(0.006) 		

Industry munificence

0.066

−0.005

(0.010)

0.548

(0.001) 		

0.000

(0.011) 		
Board tenure

0.175

(0.328) 		

(0.001) 		
Board size

0.001

0.000

(0.002)

(0.041) 		

0.009

(0.328) 		
Volume of competitive activity

0.013

0.361
(0.022)

0.003

(0.002) 		

(0.041) 		
TMT in-the-money, exercisable options

−0.005

(0.010) 		

0.528

(0.002) 		
CEO duality

0.000

(0.002) 		

(0.010) 		
Firm age

0.365

0.000

(0.392)

(0.022) 		

0.002

(0.002) 		
Current ratio

0.000

(0.392) 		

−0.460

0.050

(0.235)

0.033

0.728

0.020

			(0.314) 		(0.314)
Transient ownership 			

0.132

0.625

0.141

0.600

			(0.269) 		(0.269)
Pay gap 			

0.384

0.016

0.491

0.003

			(0.159) 		(0.163)
Ded. ownership × Pay gap 					

10.559

0.002

					
(3.490)
Included 		

Included 		

Included

N

Year dummy variables

8,173 		

8,173 		

8,173

Chi-sq

4287.8

4305.2

4320.1

df

0.000

22 		

Standard errors in parentheses, P-values in italics.
DV: Competitive complexity.

0.000

25 		

26

0.000
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Supplementary analyses
As mentioned, we did not develop a formal hypothesis about the interactive effect between firms’ CEO-TMT pay gap and their level of
transient institutional investment because we expected these forces
to cancel each other out. This interaction (not reported) is not a good
predictor of competitive complexity.
We derived our control variables for board influence on strategic
outcomes from Golden and Zajac (2001), but these authors actually
suggest that our board control variables (board size, average tenure,
and average age) have curvilinear relationships with firm outcomes.
To test whether this possibility would affect our findings, we added
squared terms for these control variables to our models and found that
two of them (size and tenure) did, in fact, have curvilinear effects, but
the results of our models with these additional squared controls were
substantively the same.
Given the large number of control variables in our models, we also
checked for the possibility of over-fitting by looking at the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1987). The AIC resolves the potential problem of model over-fitting by introducing a penalty for the number of parameters in the model. Models with low values of AIC offer the
best balance between model fit and specificity. The AIC for Model 6 with
control variables is 32,278, and for Model 8 with all predictors the AIC
is 32,266. This suggests that the full model, which accounts for all hypothesized variables and control variables together, provide a better fit
to the data than the model with our control variables only.
Last, we tested for endogeneity in our performance models. Considering that capability is a key antecedent to competitive actions (Chen,
1996), it is possible that firms with high performance in the short term,
or increasing performance trends leading up to the focal year of analysis, are better able to engage in complex competitive repertoires. Thus,
there is some potential for reverse causality. To address this issue, we
conducted instrument variable regressions using xtivreg2 in Stata to
help determine if competitive repertoire complexity is exogenous.
We identified competitive action richness and the firm’s net plant,
property, and equipment (PPE) as exogenous and relevant instrumental variables (Kennedy, 2008). Richness of a firm’s competitive repertoire is a count of the number of different action types a firm undertakes in a given year, but does not account for the total number of
actions, the concentration of those actions, or repetitiveness of actions
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between years. As a result, richness should be related to competitive
repertoire complexity, without necessarily having a strong relation
to short-term performance (r=-0.02) or the firms’ performance over
time (r=-0.01). Similarly, a firm’s net PPE represents the cost of all
buildings included in its PPE account, minus accumulated depreciation. A larger net PPE can reflect more valuable assets and represent a
firm’s ability to engage in competitive actions (Chen, 1996), but holding these resources alone should not necessarily influence short-term
performance (r=0.02) or the performance trend (r=−0.01).
Using these two instrumental variables (richness and net PPE),
we examined the strength of our instruments for complexity using
xtivreg2 in both the short-term performance and performance trend
models. In both cases, a high Chi-2 statistic for the under-identification test (p<0.001), and a much lower Chi-2 for the over-identification test (p=0.149 and p=0.830) suggest that our instruments predict competitive repertoire complexity, but are not correlated with
the DV beyond their indirect relationship to the DV via complexity.
Further, in testing for weak instruments, or instruments that have a
weak relationship with competitive complexity, we find F-statistics
far greater than the recommended threshold of 10. Collectively, these
findings suggest that richness and net PPE are relevant and strong instruments in both of our models. Using these two instrumental variables, we conducted endogeneity tests in both the short-term performance and performance trend models. The endog() option in xtivreg2
presents an endogeneity test that examines if a potentially endogenous regressor can be treated as exogenous, allowing for a more efficient estimator to be used than the instrument variables approach.
In both the short-term performance and performance trend models,
we failed to reject the null hypothesis that competitive complexity can
be treated as exogenous, indicating that endogeneity is unlikely to be
problematic to our models.

Discussion
Antecedents to competitive repertoire complexity
Relying on agency theory, we theorized and found that the presence of dedicated institutional investors encourages firms to engage
in complex competitive repertoires. Using tournament theory, we
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hypothesized and found that the CEO-TMT pay gap was an important
predictor of the extent to which a firm engages in complex competitive repertoires. Last, we also found that the dedicated investors of
our agency theory arguments and the CEO-TMT pay gap of our tournament theory arguments complemented each other with respect to
their influence on firms’ competitive repertoire complexity. Little past
work has examined how shareholders and compensation structures
jointly affect firm outcomes, but our results make progress toward
integrating governance research with work on competitive dynamics. One implication is that scholars should account for these potential drivers in future competitive dynamics studies, or such studies
will risk underspecifying the antecedents of a firm’s choice of competitive moves.
Contrary to our prediction (i.e., Hypothesis 3), ownership by transient investors was not associated negatively with competitive complexity. Perhaps there are different kinds of transient institutional investors that we did not capture with our operationalization, which is
based on trading behavior. Some transient institutional investors may
be more knowledgeable than others, and as such, for certain firms the
former occasionally act more like dedicated investors. Knowledgeable
transient investors could wash out the influence of other transient investors that happen to be less knowledgeable, and consequently, less
aware of the strategic benefits of complex repertoires. Given this potential explanation, viewing transient investors as a monolithic group
could mask a source of variance. We thus recommend that future
scholars gather primary data (as opposed to our use of secondary
data) on owner types because this might help tease out important differences that are not obvious from using empirical categorizations.
Future competitive dynamics research might also expand to explore other forms of ownership. Many large public firms, such as
Walmart and Samsung, have dominant family shareholders in place,
and these owners often have strong opinions about the activities in
which the firm should engage. Other types of principals are becoming more prominent, such as sovereign wealth funds, which are entities affiliated with national governments. We can imagine the sovereign wealth fund of Dubai, for example, perhaps pressuring a firm
that it partially owns to compete in the Middle East (or facilitating its
ability to compete there). Scholars might also consider the evolving
ways in which principals interact with one another. For instance, given
the rise of proxy access proposals (Campbell et al., 2012), different
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institutional investors could find themselves sitting together on boards
of directors, which could radically influence the extent to which they
coordinate and impose joint pressure on executives.
Another important extension of agency theory might investigate
board influences on competitive complexity, which was outside the
scope of our study. All of our board-related controls were meaningful predictors of firms’ mix of competitive actions. For instance, large
boards are associated with complex repertoires, and somewhat curiously, young, short-tenured directors are associated with low competitive complexity. Thus, there may be some competing influences
among board characteristics. We expect some boards may be better
than others at monitoring competitive activity, and some may be better able to receive and process information about firms’ competitive
actions, which could help explain the causal mechanisms behind these
relationships. Future scholars might examine how boards exhibit complex or simple properties, ex ante to competitive behavior, arising from
their culture, experience, or information processing, and how these
characteristics affect the strategic guidance boards offer with respect
to competitive complexity. There may also be a need to further explore
how the board’s composition, interactions, processes, and social network structure gives rise to a collective-cognitive framework that, in
turn, shapes the firm’s competitive action repertoire.
Our study is also likely to be of interest to those doing work on
tournament theory. Whereas tournament theory’s emphasis in the
management literature has been on pay gaps encouraging employees
to work harder (Devaro, 2006), our study adds that they also work
more broadly in an effort to distinguish themselves, and hopefully, increase their chances of becoming the next CEO. Specifically, we theorize and find that tournaments increase the breadth of activity in
which people engage as they try to prove themselves worthy of promotion. This is a seemingly novel twist on tournament theory that expands its reach from being mainly a theory of efficiency (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981) to being useful for predicting different kinds of outcomes,
such as the variety of competitive actions.
Scholars might build on our application of tournament theory to
competitive complexity by exploring the relationship in more depth.
For example, we can envision important boundary conditions to our
findings. Tournament theory offers its greatest explanatory power
when tournament participants (i.e., top managers) compete relatively independent of one another (Shi et al., 2016). When managers
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coordinate or are dependent on one another for success, it reduces
competition among them (Main, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1993). As a result,
tournament theory’s predictions about competitive complexity might
be more accurate in settings wherein top managers operate autonomously. For instance, our tournament theory arguments could hold
for firms with unrelated diversification, but have less potency when
firms have highly related business units that require cooperation and
information sharing. Similarly, tournament theory also incorporates
a stochastic component that allows for an element of randomness to
tournament outcomes (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990). In scenarios
wherein luck, noise, or other random factors make important contributions to managerial output (e.g., in uncertain environments), the
CEO-TMT pay gap may not be a good predictor of managerial behavior (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
Our study also contributes to research on the concept of competitive complexity (Miller, 1993) in part by introducing the notion of time
to the construct. Prior work has described complexity mainly as the
diversity of a firm’s competitive action repertoire (Ferrier et al., 1999;
Rindova et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2009), but we leverage theory and research to add that it also involves change and the newness of competitive action types. Returning to our prior illustration of Kohl’s and
Finish Line highlights why including these two elements improves our
ability to capture competitive repertoire complexity. In 2007, Kohl’s
appeared to be more competitively complex than Finish Line when
applying a narrow measure (e.g., a diversity index), but Finish Line
scored higher in terms of our composite measure.
The performance effects of competitive repertoire complexity
In terms of explaining firm performance—a goal that is central to strategic management research (Nag, Hambrick, and Chen, 2007)—previous inquiry has hinted at the possibility of differential short- and
long-term consequences of competitive complexity, but not tested it
empirically (Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Miller and Chen, 1996a). As we
predicted, competitive complexity was found to adversely affect shortterm performance but improve firms’ performance over time, controlling for competitive aggressiveness (i.e., the number of competitive actions). Our findings about the implications of competitive complexity
for short-term performance and the performance trend suggest that
firms can benefit from aiming for a careful balance between simplicity
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and complexity that will allow them to gain the advantages of complex competitive repertoires, but without confusing stakeholders or
overburdening their executive team.
Future research into the competitive complexity—performance
relationship might benefit from examining transient investors more
closely. As shown in Table 4, our results suggest that transient ownership has a positive impact on a firm’s long-term performance trend.
This indicates that the presence of transient institutional investors
might benefit firms, even though many executives—and strategic management theorists—view them as detrimental. One potential explanation is that transient institutional investors could prod executives to
answer a different set of challenging questions about their decisions
and performance compared to the questions dedicated investors are
asking, and dealing with a broader set of questions leads companies
to improve.
Our results regarding the competitive complexity—performance
link also offer potentially important practical implications. Some firms
may be reluctant to pull the trigger on building more complex competitive repertoires, knowing that doing so could hurt their bottom
line in the short term, but we find that doing so can provide rewards
if they stick with it. Armed with this knowledge, executives may want
to woo particular types of shareholders (e.g., dedicated institutional
investors) who provide managers with an extra measure of freedom
to take on complex competitive repertoires (Bushee, 2004). For example, General Electric has stopped providing quarterly earnings guidance (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2011) with a view toward deterring investors who are looking to make a “quick buck.” Not providing
quarterly earnings guidance might be entirely acceptable to the kind
of shareholders who are concerned with the strategic gains that complex repertoires confer.
To the extent that future studies confirm our results, the link we
found between competitive complexity and performance suggests that
firms could benefit from building consideration of the competitive
complexity concept into their strategy making process. Any potential
competitive move needs to be judged on its own merits, but also assessing how a potential move shapes the complexity of a competitive
repertoire can add an extra and valuable dimension to a firm’s selfassessment efforts. To ensure that complexity is incorporated into the
strategy making process, a firm might benefit from designating a senior executive to actively monitor the complexity of its competitive

C o n n e l ly e t a l . i n S t r at e g i c M a n a g e m e n t J o u r n a l 3 8 ( 2 0 1 7 )

36

repertoire. This point person would work to ensure that complexity
lies in the sweet spot between being too low and too high.
Limitations
We were not able to capture the magnitude of competitive actions; a
dimension that relates to the amount of resources necessary to implement an action, its irreversibility, time horizon, and difficulty of implementation. Connelly et al. (2010), for example, hand coded competitive actions taken by 72 firms based on these four dimensions using
independent raters to arrive at a magnitude score. Adopting such a
measure would be unwieldy for our study of 1,168 firms and 87,941
actions.
A related caveat to our study is that researchers using RavenPack
cannot provide the same level of fine-grained scrutiny that they can
within the typical competitive dynamics study. However, our data allowed us to account for intra-industry behavioral norms while establishing the validity of the relationships across industry boundaries.
In this way, our study complements extant studies that provide more
in-depth examinations of actions within a particular industry. Relatedly, because the nature of our data did not lend itself well to structural equation modeling (SEM), scholars might provide further complementarity to extant work by using SEM to assess the causal web of
relationships involving governance, competitive repertoire complexity, and firm performance.

Conclusion
Using data from 1,168 firms that competed in 204 different industries over a 10-year period, we devoted our attention to unpacking the
drivers and consequences of competitive complexity. As top managers
look to engage rivals, they are likely to consider not only their own
firm’s abilities and rival actions, but also the controlling forces acting
on them. After all, top managers generally act in ways in which they
are incentivized, so we should expect them to undertake competitive
moves for which they will be rewarded and for which they will receive
the most support. For these reasons, we theorize and find that a firm’s
ownership structure and relative executive compensation are consequential to the nature of its portfolio of competitive actions. Building
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competitive complexity might be painful initially but it eventually pays
off, as long as managers do not go overboard. We hope our study spurs
more research on competitive complexity and further investigation at
the intersection of governance and competitive dynamics.
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